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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S CONVICTION OF 
DAWN SWEAZEY ON FIVE COUNTS OF VARIOUS 
ZONING AND HEALTH CODE VIOLATIONS; AND, 
HAS SWEAZEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S VERDICT? 
Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a criminal trial, the appellate court should review the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury, and should 
only reverse a conviction when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed 
the crime of which she was convicted. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 
352 (Utah App. 1995). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated: 
In order to bring a claim of insufficiency of 
evidence, an appellant "must marshal the 
evidence supporting the . . . findings and 
demonstrate how the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the disputed 
findings." State v. Peterson, 841 P.2d 21, 25 
(Utah App. 1992) . Failure to marshal the 
evidence waives an appellant's right to have 
his claim of insufficiency considered on 
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appeal. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 
(Utah App. 1990). 
State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-1190 (Utah App. 1993). 
II. IS SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY 
CITY CODE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
Standard of Review: This issue was not raised below, and 
should be reviewed under the "plain error" standard. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show 
that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). An 
error is harmful if, "absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome" for the defendant, or "our confidence 
in the verdict is undermined." Id. at 1208-
09. 
State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 728 (Utah App. 1997). 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
JURY TO BE TOLD THAT CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS 
PLACED INTO EVIDENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN ON 
THE VIOLATION DATE, JANUARY 27, 1995, 
BECAUSE THE CITY HAD STIPULATED TO SAID 
DATE, WHEN, IN FACT, IT WAS KNOWN TO BOTH 
PARTIES AND THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS WERE NOT TAKEN ON JANUARY 27, 
1995, AND THAT THE STIPULATION HAD BEEN 
MADE IN ERROR? 
Standard of Review: It is within the discretion of the trial 
court to set aside stipulations of the parties. State v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). Therefore, this issue should 
be reviewed on a "abuse of discretion" standard. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
See Addendum for the following determinative statutes and 
ordinances: 
Utah State Code (1995) 
§ 10-9-804. Maps and plats required. 
West Valley City Code (1995) 
§ 7-1-103. Definitions. 
§ 7-2-113. Measurement of Setback. 
§ 7-2-117. Fences. 
§ 7-6-303. Permitted Uses. 
§ 7-6-305. Minimum Lot and Setback Requirements. 
§ 24-2-111. Accumulation of Solid Waste and Littering. 
§ 24-8-105. Real Property to Be Kept Clean and Secured. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves prosecution and conviction in the Third 
Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for the following violations: 
Count WVC Code Violation Penalty Type 
1 7-1-108 Infraction (*) 
Building Permit 
2 7-1-108 Infraction (*) 
Building Permit 
3 7-2-111 Infraction (*) 
Clear View of Intersection 
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Count WVC Code Violation Penalty Type 
4 7-2-117 Infraction 
Fence 
5 7-6-305 Infraction 
Minimum Lot Setback 
6 7-6-303 Infraction 
Permitted Use, Single-Family 
Residential Zone 
7 24-2-111 Class B Misdemeanor 
Accumulation of Solid Waste 
8 24-2-111 Class B Misdemeanor 
Accumulation of Solid Waste 
9 24-8-105 Class B Misdemeanor 
Real Property Kept Clean 
(*) = dismissed 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced by the filing of an 
Information against Defendant Dawn Sweazey on March 27, 1995. 
Record, p. 1. On May 1, 1995, Sweazey filed a Jury Trial Demand 
and Defendant's Discovery Requests. Record, pp. 4 and 6. A 
pretrial conference was held before Judge William A. Thorne on 
October 3, 1995; however, the case was not resolved and was set for 
jury trial. Sweazey filed several pretrial motions, which were 
heard before Judge Thorne on October 30, 1995; before 
Judge Judith S. Atherton on December 12, 1995, and January 22, 
1996; and before Judge Carlos A. Esqueda on March 11, 1996. 
Following the motion hearings, the City filed an Amended 
Information on March 21, 1996. Record, pp. 88-89. 
4 
On August 21, 1996, a jury trial on the charges set forth in 
the Amended Information was held before Judge Ronald E. Nehring. 
Judge Nehring dismissed Charges 1, 2, and 3, and, at the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury found Sweazey guilty of the remaining six 
charges. Sweazey filed Defendants Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict on September 3, 1996. Record, p. 153. At a 
hearing held on September 30, 1996, Judge Nehring denied Sweazey's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and her Motion for 
a New Trial and sentenced Sweazey as set forth below. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
On August 21, 1996, a jury convicted Sweazey of Counts 4 
through 9 and imposed the following fines and assessments: 
Count Fine/Assessment 
4 $40 fine 
5 $40 fine 
6 $40 fine 
7 $250 fine ($200 suspended); 
180 days jail (suspended) 
8 $250 fine ($200 suspended); 
180 days jail (suspended) 
9 $250 fine ($200 suspended); 
180 days jail (suspended) 
Record, p. 163. Sweazey filed her Notice of Appeal with the Court 
of Appeals on November 4, 1996. Record, p. 166. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dawn Sweazey is the owner of a residential house and lot 
located at 7174 West Tenway, West Valley City, Utah. Transcript, 
p. 39, lines 8-10; p. 57, lines 23-26; p. 58, line 1. 
2. On January 27, 1994, the West Valley City Ordinance 
Enforcement Division received a complaint of inoperable vehicles, 
debris, and a trailer full of yard debris located on Sweazeyfs 
property. Transcript, p. 40, lines 5-12. 
3. Officer Terri Nordell of the West Valley City Ordinance 
Enforcement Division viewed the property on February 1, 1994, and 
attempted to serve Sweazey with a violation notice, which Sweazey 
refused to accept. Transcript, p. 40, lines 12-22. 
4. Following several follow-up visits and written notices 
over the course of 1994, Sweazey exercised her right to an 
administrative hearing regarding the condition of her property. 
The administrative hearing was held on December 6, 1994. 
Transcript, p. 52, lines 17-26; p. 53, lines 1-9. 
5. Following the administrative hearing, Sweazey was ordered 
to correct certain conditions existing on her property. 
Transcript, p. 54, lines 13-26; p. 55, lines 1-26; and Trial 
Exhibit 12. 
6. Officer Nordell visited the property on January 16, 1995, 
and found that Sweazey had not complied with the terms of the 
notice. Officer Nordell took certain photographs that were marked 
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as trial Exhibits 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. Transcript, p. 56, 
lines 1-21; p. 58, lines 2-7. 
7. Officer Nordell returned to the Sweazey property on 
January 27, 1995, and observed the property to be essentially in 
the same condition as it was on January 16, 1995. Transcript, 
p. 60, lines 1-7. 
8. On March 27, 1995, the City filed an Information, 
charging Sweazey with violations observed by Officer Nordell on 
January 27, 1995. 
9. No photographs actually taken by Officer Nordell on 
January 27, 1995, were entered into evidence at trial; however, 
based on the trial court's ruling to enforce an earlier stipulation 
by the City, it was inaccurately represented to the jury that the 
photographs comprising Exhibits 19 through 23 at trial were taken 
on January 27, 1995. Transcript, pp. 4-21. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE CITY WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S GUILTY 
VERDICT ON EACH CHARGE, AND SWEAZEY 
FAILED TO MARSHAL THAT EVIDENCE IN HER 
BRIEF. 
Sweazey relies on the photographs that were admitted as 
Exhibits 19 through 23 at trial. The photographs purport to show 
the Sweazey property in a condition that does not violate the 
ordinances with which she was charged. She now uses these 
photographs to argue that insufficient evidence exists to convict 
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her of the charges. Her argument is without merit, since the 
photographs are not competent evidence. It was known to both 
parties and the trial court that the photographs were not taken on 
the violation date, January 27, 1995, but, rather, were taken 
sometime before that date. Based on a ruling by the trial court, 
the jury was informed that the parties had stipulated the 
photographs were taken on January 27, 1995, even though everyone 
but the jury knew that that was not a factual statement. 
Despite the confusion regarding the date of the photographs, 
competent testimonial evidence, which was not inconclusive or 
inherently improbable and which supports the jury!s verdicts of 
guilty on Counts 4 through 9 of the Amended Information, was 
presented to the jury. 
Sweazey has failed to comply with the Court's marshaling 
requirements in her Brief. In making her argument, Sweazey 
neglected to marshal virtually all of the evidence presented 
supporting the jury's verdicts. By failing to marshal the evidence 
against her, Sweazey has waived her right to raise an 
"insufficiency of the evidence" claim on appeal. 
II. SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY 
CITY CODE REGARDING SETBACKS OF SIDE YARD 
FENCES IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Sweazey has failed to specify with any particularity the 
section of the West Valley City ordinances she believes to be 
unconstitutional. She has also failed to describe which provision 
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of the Constitution it offends and which Constitution, the United 
States Constitution or the Utah Constitution, she is referring to. 
Finally, Sweazey fails to assert any credible basis for a finding 
of unconstitutionality. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THE 
PARTIES TO A STIPULATION THAT HAD BEEN 
BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT AND, THEREBY, 
CAUSED MISINFORMATION TO BE PRESENTED TO 
THE JURY. 
Prior to trial, the City had stipulated that certain 
photographs, later marked as Exhibits 19 through 23, had been taken 
on the alleged violation date, January 27, 1995. Prior to trial, 
it became apparent that the stipulation was based on a mistake of 
fact, and that the photographs had not been taken on January 27, 
1995, but sometime prior to that date. Despite the mistake of 
fact, the trial court ruled that the City would be held to the 
stipulation. This resulted in the jury's being misinformed as to 
the actual date the photographs were taken. The trial court 
clearly had the power to set aside the stipulation based on a 
mistake of fact, yet failed to do so. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE CITY WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S GUILTY 
VERDICT ON EACH CHARGE, AND SWEAZEY 
FAILED TO MARSHAL THAT EVIDENCE IN HER 
BRIEF. 
Appellant Dawn Sweazey1s consistent theme throughout her Brief 
is that the evidence presented to the jury was contradicted by 
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certain photographs and, therefore, was insufficient to support her 
convictions. In pursuing her argument, she relies on a series of 
photographs, Exhibits 19 through 23, that were presented at trial. 
The photographs purport to show the Sweazey property in a non-
violatmg condition on the date the violations are alleged to have 
occurred, January 27, 1995. However, Sweazey's reliance on the 
photographs is without merit, since the photographs are not 
competent evidence. It is clear from pretrial argument that both 
parties and the trial court judge were aware that the photographs 
had not been taken on January 27,1995, but, rather, sometime prior 
to that date. Even if the photographs were competent evidence, the 
mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal of 
a conviction. State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
At a previous proceeding, the City had erroneously stipulated 
that the photographs comprising Exhibits 19 through 23 had been 
taken on the violation date. This error was brought to the 
attention of the trial court immediately prior to trial, and a 
lengthy argument ensued regarding the presentation of the exhibits 
to the jury. Transcript, pp. 4-21. Following the argument, the 
trial court judge ruled that the City would have to stand by its 
previous stipulation, and that the jury would be told that the City 
had stipulated that Exhibits 19 through 23 were photographs that 
had been taken on January 27, 1995. Transcript, p. 20, lines 12-
24. The ruling was made with the trial court's full knowledge that 
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the stipulation was in error. Transcript, p. 8, lines 10-18; 
p. 22, lines 18-20; p. 23, lines 2-11. Even Sweazey admits in her 
Brief that "photos 19 through 23 fail to show the status of the 
property as of the alleged violation date of January 27, 1995." 
Appellant!s Brief, p. 12, lines 2-3. 
Given the obvious confusion caused by telling the jury the 
incorrect date of the photographs, it is not surprising that the 
jury chose to rely on the other evidence presented at trial. On 
each count, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to 
sustain a conviction. The evidence can be summarized as follows. 
COUNT 4: "FENCE" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-2-117(2)) 
"DEFENDANT FAILED TO KEEP A 20 FOOT SETBACK FROM THE 
FRONT OF HER PROPERTY AND INSTEAD HAS A 5 FT SOLID FENCE 
BUILT UP TO THE SIDEWALK." 
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89. 
The City!s witness at trial was Officer Terrie Nordell of the 
West Valley City Ordinance Enforcement Division. Officer Nordell 
testified that a front yard setback, for the purposes of the City's 
ordinance, is considered from the front of the house to the 
sidewalk, from property line to property line. Transcript, p. 62, 
lines 1-2. She also testified that the ordinance requires that 
within the 20-foot setback, a fence or wall must be at least 50 
percent open, or, in the alternative, can only be two feet high. 
Transcript, p. 58, lines 15-17. 
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The height and location of the "fence" (which is actually a 
solid, cinder block wall) was uncontroverted at trial. 
Officer Nordell testified that the height of the fence was 
approximately four and a half feet (Transcript, p. 59, lines 12-
18), and that it was present on January 27, 1995 (Transcript, 
p. 61, lines 9-11). Finally, Sweazey stipulated at trial that the 
fence was four feet in height and extended along the side yard 
boundary of the property, all the way to the front sidewalk. 
Transcript, p. 46, lines 13-17; p. 58, lines 22-25. 
The evidence presented at trial with regard to the fence 
violation is not inconclusive or inherently improbable and is 
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. 
COUNT 5: "MINIMUM LOT SETBACK" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-6-305(1)) 
"DEFENDANT HAS BLOCKS AND A BOX CAR IN THE SET BACK AREA 
OF HER PROPERTY." 
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89. 
The testimony of Officer Nordell at trial provided sufficient 
evidence that a "boxcar" was present within the front yard setback 
on January 27, 1995. First, Officer Nordell testified that the 
boxcar was present when she visited the property and took 
photographs on January 16, 1995. Transcript, p. 58, lines 2-7. 
She further testified that she visited the property on the 
violation date, January 27, 1995, and that the conditions had not 
changed since her visit on January 16. Transcript, p. 60, lines 1-
12 
7. Finally, Officer Nordell testified that the boxcar was located 
between seven and ten feet from the sidewalk, clearly within the 
area she had previously testified comprised the front yard setback 
of the Sweazey home. Transcript, p. 62, lines 9-17. 
The evidence presented by the City with regard to the minimum 
lot setback violation is not inconclusive or inherently improbable 
and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. 
COUNT 6: "PERMITTED USE" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-6-303) 
"DEFENDANT IS STORING A LARGE BOX CAR ON HER PROPERTY 
WHEN SUCH IS NOT PERMITTED IN A RESIDENTIAL ZONE." 
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89. 
Officer Nordellfs testimony regarding the presence and 
location of the boxcar on the Sweazey property on January 27, 1995, 
has been outlined above. Officer Nordell also testified that the 
location of the boxcar on the Sweazey property was not a permitted 
use in an R-l-6 (Residential) Zone. Transcript, p. 62, lines 18-
21. Finally, Officer Nordell testified that she had access to the 
permits that would had to have been issued in order to legally move 
the boxcar onto the property. Transcript, p. 60, lines 23-24. 
Officer Nordell stated that she had checked those permits, that a 
permit had not been issued to Sweazey, and, therefore, that the 
boxcar had been moved onto the property without a permit. 
Transcript, p. 60, lines 20-26; p. 61, lines 1-6; p. 62, lines 18-
23. 
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The evidence presented by the City at trial with regard to the 
permitted use violation is not inconclusive or inherently 
improbable and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. 
COUNT 7: "ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-2-111) 
"DEFENDANT ACCUMULATED, THREW, DISCARDED, DEPOSITED, 
PLACED, SWEPT, DUMPED, CONDUCTED OR ALLOWED ANOTHER TO DO 
THE SAME ON HER PROPERTY, TREE LIMBS, BROKEN BRICKS AND 
ASSORTED OTHER TRASH." 
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89. 
There was ample evidence presented at trial to support a 
finding that bricks, wood, and other trash were located on the 
Sweazey property. With regard to bricks, Officer Nordell testified 
that the pile of broken bricks was present on January 16, 1995. 
Transcript, p. 56, lines 1-6; p. 57, lines 10-12. The bricks are 
shown in the photographs marked as Exhibits 13, 14, and 15. 
Officer Nordell also testified that the bricks were present when 
she visited the property on the violation date, January 27, 1995 
(Transcript, p. 63, lines 7-17) and were even present when she 
visited the property sometime after the violation date (Transcript, 
p. 67, lines 2-4) . 
It was also Officer Nordell!s testimony that she observed 
other solid waste when she viewed the property on the violation 
date, January 27, 1995. She stated that she observed an old 
dishwasher, kitchen chairs, and some wood mixed in with the bricks. 
Transcript, p. 63, lines 7-26; p. 64, lines 1-8. 
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The evidence presented at trial with regard to the 
"accumulation of solid waste" violation is not inconclusive or 
inherently improbable and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of 
the jury. 
COUNT 8: "ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-2-111) 
"DEFENDANT HAS ON HER PROPERTY 2 UNLICENSED OR INOPERABLE 
VEHICLES AND VEHICLE PARTS." 
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89. 
This charge of accumulation of solid waste was based on 
inoperable vehicles located on the Sweazey property. 
Officer Nordell testified that when she visited the Sweazey 
property on January 16, 1995, one of the vehicles in question, a 
Camaro, was on the property behind the boxcar. Transcript, p. 64, 
lines 18-19. She testified that the other two vehicles that had 
been on the property had been moved across the street to Sweazey's 
son's property and were still licensed and inoperable. Transcript, 
p. 64, lines 19-21. Officer Nordell also testified that when she 
visited the property on the violation date, January 27, 1995, the 
property and the violations thereon were unchanged from her 
January 16 visit. Transcript, p. 60, lines 1-7. 
Based on the foregoing, the jury had sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the Camaro was located on the Sweazey property on 
January 27, 1995, thereby providing sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict of the jury. 
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COUNT 9: "REAL PROPERTY KEPT CLEAN" VIOLATION 
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-8-105(4)) 
"DEFENDANT HAS OR MAINTAINS ON HER PROPERTY UNSIGHTLY OR 
DELETERIOUS OBJECTS OR STRUCTURES ON THE PROPERTY WHICH 
SHE OWNS OR RESIDES." 
Amended Information - Record, p. 88-89. 
The parties had stipulated that Sweazey is the owner of the 
property. Transcript, p. 57, lines 23-26; p. 58, line 1. Also, it 
is uncontroverted that Sweazey received notice that her property 
was in violation, and that she was required to clean it. A copy of 
the notice was presented as evidence and marked as Exhibit 12. 
Transcript, p. 54, lines 13-26. Officer Nordell testified that 
Sweazey had been given notice to clean the property and had failed 
to do so. Transcript, p. 64, lines 22-26; p. 65, lines 1-3. This 
is further substantiated by Officer Nordell's testimony, which is 
set forth above, with regard to the inoperable vehicles, bricks, 
appliances, chairs, and wood, which she has previously testified 
were still present on the property on the violation date. 
The evidence presented with regard to the real property kept 
clean violation is not inconclusive or inherently improbable and is 
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. 
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Virtually all of the evidence presented above is absent from 
Sweazey's Brief. Sweazey has utterly failed to comply with the 
previous rulings of this Court requiring an appellant to marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
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how, even given that evidence, the jury has come to the wrong 
conclusion. This Court has repeatedly stated that in order to 
properly marshal the evidence, the appellant must present every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial that supports the 
findings the appellant is disputing. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994). In 
this case, the Appellant has fallen woefully short of meeting the 
marshaling requirement. That failure provides an independent 
ground to sustain the verdicts reached by the jury. By failing to 
marshal the evidence, the Appellant has waived her right to have a 
claim of insufficiency of evidence considered on appeal. State v. 
Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that for each and every 
count upon which the jury reached a verdict of guilty, there was 
sufficient competent evidence presented at trial to support that 
verdict. Also, it is obvious that Sweazey has utterly failed to 
meet the marshaling requirements set forth by this Court and, 
therefore, has waived her right to raise an insufficiency of the 
evidence claim on appeal. 
II. SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY 
CITY CODE REGARDING SETBACKS OF SIDE YARD 
FENCES IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Sweazey contends, in Argument "A" of her Brief (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 9), that the West Valley City ordinance regarding fence 
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setbacks is unconstitutional. Her argument is wholly without 
merit. 
Sweazey fails to specify which ordinance she contends is 
unconstitutional. She makes a vague reference to a "prior 
subsection" specifying that property lines shall be designated on 
the "official" plats kept by the County Recorder. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 9, lines 10-11. The Appellee has been unable to locate 
a West Valley City ordinance defining the front yard setback that 
defines "property line" as Sweazey describes. To the contrary, the 
appropriate measurement is from the right-of-way line as shown on 
the official map, which is defined at Section 7-1-103(119) of the 
West Valley City Code, or from the existing right-of-way line. The 
ordinance that governs the measurement of setbacks is Section 7-2-
113 of the West Valley City Code, which specifically states as 
follows: 
7-2-113. MEASUREMENT OF SETBACK. 
Wherever a front yard is required for a 
lot facing on a street for which an official 
map has been recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder, the depth of such front yard 
shall be measured from the mapped street line 
provided by the official map. Where an 
official map has not been recorded, 
measurements shall be made from the existing 
right-of-way line or from the proposed right-
of-way line, as indicated on the major street 
plan. 
In this case, Officer Nordell testified that she considered 
the sidewalk to be the front setback line. Since sidewalks are 
public right-of-way, it is apparent that Officer Nordell was 
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measuring from the existing right-of-way line. Since both the 
testimony and the stipulation of the parties established that the 
fence ran along the side yard property line right up to the 
sidewalk, there is little possibility that any reasonable person 
would not understand that it lies within the front yard setback 
area. 
Sweazey fails to specify which section of the Constitution or 
even which Constitution, the United States Constitution or the Utah 
Constitution, she feels is being violated. However, she seems to 
contend that plats recorded by the County Recorder cannot establish 
property lines. This is obviously not true. Plats are a well 
established method of establishing property boundaries, 
particularly when subdividing larger parcels of property into lots. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-804 (1953). Furthermore, it has long been 
recognized that, "Where there is a recorded plat, the conveyance of 
land by designation of lot number and block number and name of the 
plat or subdivision passes the title of the grantors the same as if 
such lots had been described by metes and bounds." Hall v. North 
Ogden City, 166 P.2d 221 (Utah 1946). 
Sweazey has failed to provide this Court with a description of 
the very subsection she believes to be defective, a description of 
the Constitution and/or constitutional provision she believes to be 
violated, and any credible argument as to why such subsection 
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should be found unconstitutional. This Court should disregard 
Sweazey's argument and affirm the verdicts of the jury. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THE 
PARTIES TO A STIPULATION THAT HAD BEEN 
BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT AND, THEREBY, 
CAUSED MISINFORMATION TO BE PRESENTED TO 
THE JURY. 
West Valley City believes that much of the confusion in this 
case is the result of an erroneous ruling by the trial court judge. 
That ruling allowed incompetent evidence to come before the jury, 
and the incompetent evidence forms the basis for much of Sweazey's 
argument in her appeal. 
The problem arose when, at a prior deposition and in a hearing 
before the court, the West Valley City Prosecutor stipulated that 
the photographs that eventually became Exhibits 19 through 23 had 
been taken on the violation date, January 27, 1995. Upon reviewing 
the file with the Ordinance Enforcement Officer prior to trial, it 
became apparent that the stipulation was based on a mistake of 
fact, and that the photographs could not have been taken on that 
date. Immediately prior to trial, Sweazey argued to the court that 
since the City had previously stipulated that the photographs were 
taken on the violation date, the City must be held to that 
stipulation, and the jury must be told that the photographs 
represented the condition of the property on January 27, 1995. 
This was clearly to Sweazey's advantage, since many of the 
photographs showed the violations absent from the property. The 
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City urged the court to set aside the stipulation and allow the 
accurate date of the photographs to be presented to the jury. 
It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing that both 
parties and the court were aware that the stipulation was in error. 
Transcript, pp. 4-21. Initially, it was the trial court's 
inclination to set aside the stipulation. The court stated: 
I find, however, that in my view we are here 
in part to seek the truth. And it would be 
also offensive to me if the photographs were 
introduced into evidence in this trial and it 
were placed on the record that the photographs 
were taken on a date that everyone knew wasn't 
the right date of the photograph and, in fact, 
the photographs were communicating to the jury 
an inaccurate picture of whatever they were 
supposed to portray and we all knew it except 
the jury by virtue of a ruling of estoppel. 
Transcript, p. 8, lines 10-18. 
Ultimately, however, the trial court, apparently believing it 
to be legally bound to accept the stipulation, ruled that the jury 
would be told the incorrect date of the photographs. The court 
stated, "I am going to find that the City is going to be bound by 
its stipulation relative to the dates of the photographs and may 
not at the trial introduce evidence of dates contrary to the 
stipulation." Transcript, p. 20, lines 12-15. The City had a 
continuing objection to this ruling. Transcript, p. 20, lines 25-
26. 
The ruling of the trial court was clearly in error. Utah law 
establishes that trial courts have the power to set aside 
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stipulations entered into advertently or for justifiable cause. 
Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, mistakes of 
fact have specifically been found to be a valid ground for setting 
aside stipulations in appropriate circumstances. State v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, West Valley City asserts that the trial court 
judge abused his discretion by failing to set aside the erroneous 
stipulation of the parties, thereby allowing inaccurate evidence to 
be presented to the jury. It is now the erroneous stipulation and 
the inaccurate photographs that form the basis for Sweazey's 
"inadequacy of the evidence" argument on appeal. West Valley City 
believes the trial court's decision to be harmless error and that 
the jury verdicts were adequately supported by other competent 
evidence, but the City urges this Court to examine the trial 
court's ruling in its decision in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that 
Sweazey's appeal be denied, and that her convictions be affirmed. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 1998. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J. M3ichard Catten, Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: UTAH CODE (1995) 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES: WEST VALLEY CITY CODE (1995) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE (1995) 
10-9-804. Maps and plats required. 
(1) Whenever any lands are laid out and platted, the owner of those lands shall cause an 
accurate map or plat to be made of them that sets forth and describes: 
(a) all the parcels of ground laid out and platted, by their boundaries, course, and 
extent, and whether they are intended for streets or other public uses, together with any areas 
that are reserved for public purposes; and 
(b) all blocks and lots intended for sale, by numbers, and their precise length and 
width. 
(2) (a) The owner of the land shall acknowledge the map or plat before an officer 
authorized by law to take the acknowledgement of conveyances of real estate. 
(b) The surveyor making the map or plat shall certify it. 
(c) The legislative body shall approve the map or plat as provided in this part. 
(3) After the map or plat has been acknowledged, certified, and approved, the owner of the 
land shall file and record it in the county recorder's office in the county in which the lands platted 
and laid out are situated. 1991 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES 
WEST VALLEY CITY CODE (1995) 
7-1-103. DEFINITIONS. 
Whenever any words or phrases used in this Title are not defined herein, but are defined in 
related sections of the Utah Code or in the Subdivision Ordinance, such definitions are incorporated 
herein and shall apply as though set forth herein in full, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary 
intention. Words not defined in any Code shall have their ordinarily accepted meanings within the 
context in which they are used. 
Unless a contrary intention clearly appears, words used in the present tense include the future, 
the singular includes the plural, the term "shall" is always mandatory, and the term "may" is 
permissive. The following terms as used in this Title shall have the respective meanings hereinafter 
set forth. 
(119) "Official Map" means the public street map adopted by the City Council as provided 
in Title 10, Chapter 9, Sections 23 through 25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
7-2-113. MEASUREMENT OF SETBACK. 
Wherever a front yard is required for a lot facing on a street for which an official map has 
been recorded in the office of the County Recorder, the depth of such front yard shall be measured 
from the mapped street line provided by the official map. Where an official map has not been 
recorded, measurements shall be made from the existing right-of-way line or from the proposed 
right-of-way line, as indicated on the major street plan. 
7-2-117. FENCES. 
(1) A six-foot fence of any material may be constructed on or within property lines, as shown 
on the official plats maintained in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, in side and rear 
yards. This shall include side yards of corner lots, provided clear view of intersections can be 
maintained as outlined in Section 7-2-111. 
(2) In front yards, a 20-foot setback from the front property line shall be maintained for 
fences over four feet in height. Fences four feet or less in height, which are at least 50 percent 
transparent, may be allowed up to the front property line or, if sidewalk exists, up to the sidewalk. 
No solid fence over two feet in height shall be allowed closer than 20 feet to the front property line. 
(3) Fence Height. Where there is a difference in the grade of the properties on either side of 
a fence or wall, the height of the fence or wall shall be measured from the average grade of the 
higher property. Average grade shall be established based on elevations of finish grade within 5 feet 
of the proposed fence line. When a retaining wall exists at the property line, fence height may be 
measured from the higher side of the wall. 
(4) Fire Hydrants. When a fire hydrant is located on or near a property line, it shall be given 
a clear buffer area around the hydrant of at least three feet in order to promote easy access to the plug 
for fire protection. A fire hydrant shall not be enclosed by fencing. 
(5) When requested, the Zoning Administrator may grant a waiver or modification of any 
height requirements of this section upon finding that the waiver or modification will not circumvent 
the intent of the requirements. Any person may appeal the Zoning Administrator's decision pursuant 
to Section 7-18-104. If the Zoning Administrator so desires, he may submit the request for a waiver 
or modification directly to the Board of Adjustment for their determination. 
7-6-303. PERMITTED USES. 
The following are permitted uses in all single-family residential zones; no other permitted 
uses are allowed, except as provided in Section 7-2-114: 
(1) Agriculture 
(2) Community Uses 
(3) Home occupations - Minor 
(4) Household pets 
(5) Signs (see Title 11 - Sign Ordinance) 
(6) Single-family dwellings 
(7) Uses customarily accessory to listed permitted uses 
7-6-305. MINIMUM LOT AND SETBACK REQUIREMENTS. 
(1) The following shall be the minimum lot areas, widths and setbacks in single-family 
residential zones: 
Zone 
R-l-4 
R-l-6 
R-l-7 
R-1-8 
R-l-10 
Lot 
Area 
4,000 S.F. 
6,000 S.F. 
7,000 S.F. 
8,000 S.F. 
10,000 S.F. 
Lot 
Width 
50' 
65' 
70' 
80' 
90' 
F 
25' 
25' 
25' 
25' 
30* 
S 
0' 
6' 
8' 
8' 
8* 
DG/C 
S Side 
30' 10' 
30' 10' 
30' 10' 
30' 10' 
30' 10' 
F = Front 
R = Rear 
S = Side 
DG/C = Double Garage/Carport 
SG/C = Single Garage/Carport 
SG/C 
Side 
20' 
20' 
20' 
20' 
20' 
R 
20' 
30' 
30' 
30' 
30' 
(2) For lots with an attached double-car garage or double carport, the side yard adjacent to 
the double-car garage or double carport can be reduced to 10 feet. For lots with an attached single-
car garage or single carport, the side yard adjacent to the single-car garage or single carport can be 
reduced to 20 feet. The rear yard may be reduced to a minimum of 20 feet. 
(3) For homes existing as of the effective date of this ordinance, April 18,1990, the side yard 
setback adjacent to a one-story double-car garage, at least 18 feet wide, may be reduced to a 
minimum of four feet provided the maximum width of the garage is 20 feet and the four-foot side 
yard is hard surfaced. The garage shall continually function as a storage area for vehicles and cannot 
be converted to living space for a dwelling. 
(4) The width of lots on cul-de-sacs shall be measured at the front setback line. Such widths 
may be reduced a maximum of five feet from widths listed above. 
(5) The width of corner lots shall be increased by 10 feet from the minimum width listed 
above. The minimum side yard abutting a public or private street shall be 20 feet. 
(6) Accessory buildings may be located in the rear yard to within one foot of the side and rear 
property lines, provided the building is at least six feet to the rear of the dwelling, does not encroach 
on any recorded easements, and occupies no more than 25 percent of the rear yard, and is located no 
closer than 10 feet to a dwelling on an adjacent lot. On double frontage lots or corner lots, accessory 
buildings shall not be allowed within 20 feet of any dedicated street. 
24-2-111. ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE AND LITTERING. 
(1) Accumulation of solid waste and littering prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to accumulate, throw, discard, deposit, place, sweep, dump, conduct or allow any person to 
accumulate, throw, discard, deposit, place, sweep, dump or conduct any solid waste or litter into or 
upon any public place, private premises, street, road, alley, property abutting any alley, stream, well, 
spring, canal, ditch, gutter, lot or any other property or place, above or below ground level, except: 
(a) This section shall not apply to waste thrown, deposited or placed in 
containers meeting the requirements of these regulations and provided for the 
person's use, or a facility or site approved by the Department. 
(b) This section shall not apply to Department-approved spreading of manure or 
other materials upon the land for fertilizing or conditioning the soil, provided 
a nuisance or health hazard is not created. 
(c) This section does not preclude solid waste from being temporarily 
accumulated for immediate removal, if approved by the Department. 
(d) This section does not preclude the construction or operation of a compost 
pile, as provided in (5) of this Section. 
(e) This section does not apply to junk and scrap metal accumulated on the 
premises of a business enterprise lawfully situated and licensed for the same, 
if a nuisance or health hazard is not created. (11.1) 
(2) Abandoned, junked, or inoperable vehicles. 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to abandon a vehicle upon any highway or 
public or private property without the express or implied consent of the 
owner or person in lawful possession or control of the property. For the 
purpose of this section, a vehicle shall be presumed to be abandoned if it is 
left unattended on a highway for a period in excess of 24 hours, or on any 
public or private property for a period in excess of seven calendar days 
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful 
possession or control of the property. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or permit any scrap metal, 
dismantled, junk, wrecked, abandoned, or inoperable vehicle(s) or vehicle 
parts to remain on any property or premises, unless in connection with a 
lawfully situated and licensed business, or in an enclosed accessory structure, 
such as a garage or barn, provided such building does not impose a threat to 
life safety or a nuisance or health hazard and is constructed in accordance 
with all municipal ordinances and state building code and zoning regulations 
at the time of the original building construction. Carports are not considered 
"enclosed" for the purpose of this ordinance, 
(c) Any abandoned or inoperable vehicle(s) on a person's private property and 
not owned by him may be removed upon the property owner's request, 
provided proper Departmental authorization has been granted the wrecker. 
(11.2) 
(3) Cleaning required for vacated premises. Any person vacating a dwelling, storeroom, or 
any other structure or the immediate grounds shall remove all garbage, trash and refuse and leave 
the property in a sanitary condition within 24 hours after vacating. (11.3) 
(4) Removal of dead animals. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly permit any 
dead animal to remain upon the premises, or for the owner of any dead animal to knowingly permit 
it to remain upon any public street or property or private premises. If the owner of the dead animal 
does not remove and properly dispose of it himself or cause it to be properly removed and properly 
disposed within 24 hours after receipt of notice from the Department, the Department may cause it 
to be removed and disposed and shall assess against the owner the actual costs of removal and 
disposal. The Department may avail itself of all remedies in law to enforce removal, disposal and 
recovery of cost. If ownership of the dead animal cannot be determined, the owner of the property 
on which the dead animal is located shall be responsible for proper removal and disposal of the 
animal, and the assessing and recovering of costs shall apply to the property owner. (11.4) 
(5) Compost. A person may keep or maintain compost on his property for home gardening 
if the following requirements are complied with: 
(a) The compost shall be located and maintained to prevent the spread of disease, 
the propagation or harborage of insects or rodents, the creation of any odor 
or nuisance, or any other condition that might affect the public health, safety 
or welfare. 
(b) The compost shall not be used or sold as a commercial product or used in any 
licensed business operation unless the requirements of approval, permits, and 
operation given in Sections 24-2-109 and 24-2-114 of these regulations are 
complied with. (11.5) 
(6) Handbills and leaflets. Every person distributing commercial handbills, leaflets, flyers, 
advertising or information material shall prevent these materials from littering public or private 
property. (11.6) 
(7) Containers provided to prevent litter. To facilitate proper disposal of litter by pedestrians 
and motorists, public establishments and institutions shall provide adequate containers that are 
emptied and maintained in good condition and meet the prescribed standards in these regulations. 
The requirements shall be applicable, but not limited to, fast-food outlets, shopping centers, 
convenience stores, supermarkets, service stations, commercial parking lots, mobile canteens, 
motels, hospitals, schools and colleges. (11.7) 
(8) Construction and demolition projects. 
(a) It shall be unlawful for the owner, agent or contractor in charge of any 
construction or demolition project to cause, maintain, permit or allow to be 
caused, maintained or permitted the accumulation of any litter on the site 
before, during or after completion of the construction or demolition project. 
(b) It shall be the duty of the owner, agent or contractor to have on the site 
adequate containers for the disposal of litter and to make appropriate 
arrangements for its collection or final disposition at an authorized facility. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for the owner, agent, or contractor in charge of any 
construction or demolition project to place, for City-furnished bulky waste 
collection, waste from construction and demolition projects. 
(d) The owner, agent or contractor may be required by the Department to show 
proof of appropriate collection, or if personally transported, of final 
disposition at an authorized facility. (11.8) 
(9) Loading and unloading operations. 
(a) Any owner or occupant of an establishment or institution where litter is 
attendant to the packing or unpacking or loading or unloading of materials at 
exterior locations shall provide suitable containers for the disposal and 
storage of such litter. 
(b) It shall be the duty of such owner or occupant to remove at the end of each 
working day any litter that has not been containerized at exterior locations. 
(11.9) 
(10) Keeping property clean. 
(a) It shall be the duty of the owner or occupant to keep property free of litter. 
This requirement applies not only to removal of loose litter, but to materials 
that are or become trapped at fence and wall bases, grassy and planted areas, 
borders, embankments or other lodging points. 
(b) The owner or occupant whose property faces on municipal sidewalks, strips 
between streets and sidewalks, or strips between such properties and streets 
shall be responsible for keeping those sidewalks and strips free of litter. 
(c) It shall be unlawful to sweep or push litter from sidewalks and steps into 
streets. Sidewalk and step sweepings shall be picked up and put into 
household or commercial solid waste containers. (11.10) 
24-8-105. REAL PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND SECURED. 
It shall be unlawful for any person owning or occupying real property within West Valley 
City, after receiving written notice from the Department to fail: 
(1) To maintain the height of weeds on the property, including adjacent parking strip(s), 
alley(s) and street edge(s) as required in Section 24-8-106. (5.1) 
(2) To remove from the property and lawfully dispose of all cuttings from weeds or solid 
waste. (5.2) 
(3) To effectively secure any vacant structure. (5.3) 
(4) To maintain or repair any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures, as defined in this 
Chapter. (5.4) 
(5) To remove from the property and lawfully dispose of any unsightly or deleterious objects 
or structures. (5.5) 
(6) To remove or obliterate any graffiti from or on any structure located upon any real 
property within the City, when the graffiti is visible from the street or other public or private 
property. 
